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an initial an lySiS OF tHE POSSiblE intRODUctiOn OF a DiGital EURO 
In recent years, interest in what are known as central 
bank digital currencies (CBDCs) has grown markedly.1 
Society’s increasing digitalisation, new payment 
technology possibilities and the potential monetary policy 
and financial stability implications of private initiatives of 
this kind have led numerous central banks worldwide 
(see Table 1) to analyse the possibility of creating this 
new monetary liability that could grant the entire 
population access to central bank digital currency.
Any decision in this regard needs careful consideration 
given its many implications and the different configurations 
it could take (for example, book-entries vs. tokens, 
centralised vs. decentralised management model, 
remuneration policy). The Eurosystem began its own 
analysis more than a year ago, as it was aware of the need 
to be prepared for a possible decision to issue a digital euro. 
The outcome of an initial study2 focusing on assessing its 
potential advantages and disadvantages and the different 
design alternatives was published in October 2020. 
The report identifies some scenarios where it might be 
useful to issue a digital euro as a complement to cash. 
For example, it could be envisaged as a tool to promote 
digitalisation and payment sovereignty in the European 
economy. Issuing a digital euro could also be necessary 
if the use of cash were to decline significantly, or if foreign 
digital money or a private payment solution not overseen 
by European authorities that was broadly taken up were 
to emerge as a source of risks or instability. 
Despite its potential benefits, the implementation of a 
digital euro could also have undesired effects for the 
stability of the financial system, the functioning of the 
payment system and the effectiveness of monetary 
policy, among others. In particular, developing a digital 
euro could diminish the importance of the bank deposit 
activity. This could trigger changes in the behaviour of 
banks (increasing deposit remuneration, bundling 
deposits with other products, turning increasingly to 
more volatile market financing and to central bank 
financing) and customers (greater ability and incentives 
to withdraw funds from the banking sector during crises) 
and have implications for stability. In addition, banks, 
who play a key role in the payment system, could lose 
much of this business, which accounts for a considerable 
1	 	For	an	overview	of	the	number	of	ongoing	initiatives	across	the	world,	see	the	BIS	database	by	R.	Auer,	G.	Cornelli	and	J.	Frost	(2020),	“Rise of the 
central	bank	digital	currencies:	drivers,	approaches	and	technologies”, BIS Working Paper, No 880.
2  See “ECB Report on a digital Euro” of 2 October 2020. 
SOURCE: BIS.
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share of their revenue. As the new equilibrium would 
imply higher costs and lower revenue for banks, lending 
to households and firms would also become more 
expensive, with a knock-on effect on economic activity. 
The loss of information on bank customers due to lower 
deposit activity and the potential deterioration in banks’ 
profitability could incentivise greater risk-taking by the 
banking sector.
The report acknowledges that the design of the digital 
euro could have undesirable implications for the monetary 
policy mandate, something which is to be avoided. At the 
same time, the report does not at this stage analyse the 
possible role of the digital euro in strengthening the 
monetary policy framework. 
A disruption of the transmission channel resulting from 
digital euro-induced changes in banks’ balance sheets 
and behaviour may lead to potential adverse effects 
materialising. For example, replacing deposit funding with 
central bank borrowing could raise banks’ demand for 
collateral, thereby altering the risk-free rate, and increase 
central banks’ exposure to the economy.
Alternatively, remunerating the digital euro through 
interest could directly reinforce the transmission of 
monetary policy both in ordinary times and in times of 
crisis. The risk of bank deposits shifting to the digital euro 
in moments of stress could be mitigated by remunerating 
digital euro holdings at a variable interest rate over time, 
even to the extent of penalising them in the event of a 
bank run, for instance. In ordinary times, the direct effect 
identified by some academic studies3 also stems from 
the fact that such remuneration of the digital euro may 
act as the effective lower bound on interest rates , thus 
making it easier for central banks to control market rates. 
These claims also highlight that the mechanism could 
make it easier for negative rates to be transmitted, thus 
strengthening the policy framework for action when they 
are needed. However, the coexistence of the digital euro 
and cash limits the relevance of this objective. 
The report also includes an initial analysis of these 
impacts on the stability of the financial system and sets 
out a series of essential requirements that the digital euro 
would have to meet to limit these possible adverse 
impacts. These are, namely: to be based on the best 
technology, to allow for a standardised service throughout 
Europe and to be interoperable with private payment 
solutions, attractive as a means of payment (particularly, 
compared with cash), easy to use and secure. Its 
convertibility at par into physical euro should be 
guaranteed and the ECB should be the authority 
responsible for maintaining its value. The degree of 
involvement of financial intermediaries would be 
especially important to mitigate the effects on financial 
stability (see Figure 1).
In addition, an appropriate mix of the different design 
options and the way the support infrastructure is 
configured could help mitigate some of the possible 
adverse implications of issuing digital euro. 
Given the importance of these and other aspects, the ECB 
and the euro area central banks have continued to work 
together to identify and assess all the risks associated with 
the digital euro, and to determine what could be the most 
advisable design to ensure that the Eurosystem objectives 
are properly met. Naturally, for this initiative to be 
successful, user preferences will also have to be factored 
into its design. To this end, since the aforementioned ECB 
report was published, efforts have been made to broaden 
knowledge of the digital currency in two ways.
First, a number of practical experiments have been 
conducted to gauge the possibilities and limitations of 
the different technologies, and a solid opinion has been 
formed on the suitability of the different approaches. The 
results will be useful in facilitating any further research 
that may be conducted in the euro area.
Second, the Eurosystem has also sought to enhance 
dialogue with all the stakeholders by organising a wide-
ranging public consultation for this purpose. This initiative 
has been very well received and has provided valuable 
and detailed information on potential users’ needs and 
preferences. It has also allowed the Eurosystem to become 
familiar with the insight and expectations of the financial 
sector and other professionals, both in academia and in the 
technology industry, regarding the future of the digital euro.
The participation of the Eurosystem in various supra-national 
fora and bodies will also help enrich the Eurosystem’s 
3  M. D. Bordo and A. T. Levin (2017), “Central Bank Digital Currency and the Future of Monetary Policy”, NBER Working Paper No. 23711, National 
Bureau of Economic Research.
4  See Eurosystem report on the public consultation on a digital euro, ECB, April 2021.
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understanding of the nature of the digital euro and the 
opportunities it offers, thereby helping ensure that it can be 
fully integrated into the international monetary system. 
All this work will nurture a fresh debate in the ECB 
Governing Council with a view to outlining a possible 
future digital euro roadmap.
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